The impact of competition on productive efficiency in European railways by Gertjan Driessen et al.
 
CPB Discussion Paper 
No 71 




The impact of competition on productive 
efficiency in European railways 
 
Gertjan Driessen, Mark Lijesen and Machiel Mulder 
The responsibility for the contents of this CPB Discussion Paper remains with the author(s)   2 
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
Van Stolkweg 14 
P.O. Box 80510 
2508 GM  The Hague, the Netherlands 
 
Telephone  +31 70 338 33 80 
Telefax  +31 70 338 33 50 






ISBN 90-5833-293-4   3 
Abstract in English 
This paper empirically explores the relationship between competition design and productive 
efficiency in the railway industry. We use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to construct 
efficiency scores, and explain these scores, using variables reflecting institutional factors and 
competition design.  Our results suggest that competitive tendering improves productive 
efficiency, which is in line with economic intuition as well as with expectations on the design of 
competition. We also find that free entry lowers productive efficiency. A possible explanation 
for this result is that free entry may disable railway operators to reap economies of density. Our 
final result is that more autonomy of management lowers productive efficiency. Most of the 
incumbent railway companies are state owned and do not face any competitive pressure. As a 
consequence, increased independence without sufficient competition and adequate regulation 
may deteriorate incentives for productive efficiency.  
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JEL code: D24, H42, L22, L25, L33, L92 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
In deze studie maken we een empirische analyse van de relatie tussen institutionele vormgeving 
en productieve efficiëntie bij de spoorwegen. We gebruiken Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)  
om efficiëntiescores te bepalen, en verklaren die scores vervolgens uit variabelen die de 
institutionele vormgeving weergeven. Uit  onze analyse komt naar voren dat concurrentie om 
het spoor, door aanbesteding, leidt tot een hoger efficiëntieniveau. Concurrentie op het spoor, 
door de toegang vrij te geven, leidt daarentegen tot een afname van de efficiëntie. Een 
mogelijke reden hiervoor is dat vrije toegang ten koste van economies of density gaat. Tot slot 
concluderen we dat meer autonomie voor het management van spoorondernemingen ten koste 
gaat van de efficiëntie. Spoorwegondernemingen zijn veelal staatsbedrijven die niet hoeven te 
concurreren. Autonomie voor het management zonder concurrentie of effectieve regulering kan 
ten kosten gaan van de prikkels om efficiënt te werken. 
 
Steekwoorden: spoorwegen, efficiëntie, institutionele vormgeving  
 
Een uitgebreide Nederlandse samenvatting is beschikbaar via www.cpb.nl.   4   5 
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Summary 
Railways in Europe are in the process of restructuring, involving an increase of competition 
between operators, which is thought to bring about a higher level of productive efficiency. 
The design of competition may influence the relationship between competition and efficiency. 
This paper empirically explores the relationship between competition design and productive 
efficiency  in  the  railway  industry.  We  use  Data  Envelopment  Analysis  (DEA)  to  construct 
efficiency scores, and explain these scores, using variables reflecting institutional factors and 
competition  design.  We  choose  DEA  for  our  analysis  because  this  technique  can  take  into 
account multiple inputs and outputs, without having to rely on consistent accounting data. 
 
In the beginning of the nineties, Belgium, The Netherlands, Japan, and Sweden had railway 
systems that were considerably more efficient than the systems of the other countries in the 
analysis. By the end of the 1990s, railway systems have grown towards each other, and the 
countries in our analysis form a relatively homogenous group in terms of relative productive 
efficiency. 
  
Japan has a special position within the countries in our sample. Not only is it the only country 
outside Europe in our analysis, it is also a country with a very efficient rail system. This brings 
about a big drop in relative efficiency levels for countries that are comparable to Japan in terms 
of size. A drawback of the use of a non-parametric method like DEA is that we can use neither 
parameters nor test statistics to assess the reason behind Japan’s high efficiency score. As there 
is no clear theoretical argument to either include or exclude Japan, we further investigate the 
sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of Japan. 
 
We  analyse  the  relationship  between  our  DEA-based  efficiency  scores  and  the  design  of 
competition using a limited dependent variable model.  Our results suggest that competitive 
tendering improves productive efficiency, which is in line with economic intuition as well as 
with expectations on the design of competition. We also find that free entry lowers productive 
efficiency. A possible explanation for this result is that free entry may disable railway operators 
to reap economies of density. Our final result is that more autonomy of management lowers 
productive efficiency. Most of the incumbent railway companies are state owned and do not 
face any competitive pressure. As a consequence, increased independence without sufficient 
competition and adequate regulation may deteriorate incentives for productive efficiency.    8 
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1  Introduction 
Like many network industries, railways in Europe are in the process of restructuring, involving 
an increase of competition between operators. Rivalry between suppliers is supposed to reduce 
prices to marginal costs (allocative efficiency), reduce marginal costs to the lowest achievable 
level (productive efficiency) and encourage innovation to reduce future costs as well as to 
improve quality and variety of products (dynamic efficiency). In practice, the relationship 
between competition and efficiency is not always straightforward.  
 
Competition design may well influence the relationship between competition and efficiency, 
especially but not exclusively in the case of network industries. The design of competition is not 
straightforward in the case of railways. Issues that are subject to debate include forms of 
competition (e.g. for the market vs. in the market), vertical organisation (e.g. separation vs. 
integration) and the role of government (such as ownership and public service contracts). 
 
Empirical evidence on the impact of competition on productive efficiency in railways is not 
overwhelming. Although many studies on efficiency measurement have been conducted, only a 
few link the results to changes in competitive environment. Oum and Yu (1994) find that 
railway systems highly dependent on public subsidies are significantly less efficient and that 
systems with high degree of managerial autonomy achieve higher levels of efficiency. Gathon 
et al. (1995) discover that in the pre-liberalisation period (1961- 1988), technical efficiency of 
European railways was negatively related to the degree of government influence.  Friebel et al. 
(2003) conclude that sequential reforms have efficiency improving effects, whereas reforms 
introduced in a package have neutral effects at best.  
This paper adds to the literature by exploring the empirical relationship between competition 
design and productive efficiency. To do so, we construct efficiency scores using Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), and regress these scores against variables reflecting institutional 
factors and competition design. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing literature 
on efficiency in railway operations, followed by a brief discussion on efficiency measurement 
methods. We discuss the data used in section 4. Sections 5 and 6 contain the empirical analysis 
of this paper and section 7 concludes.   10   11 
2  Competition and productive efficiency in railways 
Jovanovic (1982) shows, both theoretically and empirically, that efficient firms grow and 
survive, while inefficient firms decline and fail. So, competitive selection improves efficiency 
by selecting those firms with low marginal costs that maximise total surplus. Empirical work by 
Olley and Pakes (1996) gives strong support to the selection effect of efficiency. Using 
sophisticated econometric techniques to analyse the telecommunication industry in the US 
during the period 1963-97, the authors find that the selective process of entry and exit is the 
major driver behind this result. More recent literature confirms the intuition that exit and entry 
play a role in increasing efficiency (Disney et al., 2000).   
 
Because of the structural peculiarities of the railway industry, competition within this industry 
may differ from many other industries. The high level of economies of density make it 
uneconomical to double networks in most countries, indicating that these networks may be 
natural monopolies.  In some countries, in particular at the American continent, infrastructure 
competition exists between parallel tracks (e.g. Canada) as well as tracks having different 
destinations or different origins (e.g. Mexico). 
 
Downstream competition can be organised in two ways. Operators may compete for passengers 
on the same lines (known as competition on the tracks) or operators may compete for temporal 
regional monopolies through tendering procedures (known as competition for the tracks). 
Competition on the tracks - is economically possible “where the size of the market is large in 
comparison to the minimum efficient scale of operation” (UN, 2003). In other words, 
economies of density may stand in the way of efficient competition on the tracks. In Europe, 
this form mainly exists in freight transport but hardly in passenger transport. Where competition 
has been introduced in passenger transport in Europe, this is mainly done by competition for the 
tracks by tendering procedures for franchises. 
 
The Australian Productivity Commission (1999) finds a positive effect of free entry in 
Australian railways on productive efficiency, although they warn that this result is somewhat 
speculative due to the complex nature of structural reforms. Friebel et al. (2003) find that 
reforms, in particular introduction of free entry, have a positive effect on railroad efficiency but 
that the impact of reforms depends on the sequencing: “the introduction of multiple reforms in a 
package has at best neutral effects, but sequential reforms improve efficiency.” Asensio et al. 
(2005) conclude that the degree of intermodal competition negatively affected productive 
efficiency of railways in a number of Spanish cities.  
 
Oum and Yu (1994) perform a comparative efficiency study of the OECD countries’ railways. 
Like the last two studies, this study predates the reforms in Europe. Their data deals with the   12 
period 1978-89. The aim of this study is to identify the implications of public subsidy and the 
degree  of  managerial  autonomy  in  technical  performance.  The  authors  estimate  technical 
efficiency by using a DEA model, assuming constant returns to scale. Two alternative output 
measures are used: 1) revenue-output measures (passenger-/ton-km) and 2) available output 
measures (passenger/freight train-km). They estimate the effects of policy and other variables 
beyond the control of management, using a Tobit regression model. The main (new) finding of 
this paper was that railway systems with high dependence on public subsidies are significantly 
less efficient than similar railways with less dependence on public funds.
1  
 
Gathon and Perelman (1992) find a high correlation between individual technical efficiency and 
autonomy, defined by an indicator representing managerial freedom with respect to authorities. 
Gathon and Pestieau (1995) also find that managerial autonomy is an important determinant of 
the government-owned railway’s performance.   
 
Cowie and Riddington (1996) examine methods of assessing rail efficiency. The authors note 
that  as  there  is  effectively  no  international  trading  and  no  common  accounting  practise, 
comparative  international  efficiency  is  best  based  on  physical  measures  rather  than  value 
measures.
2 Cowie and Riddington, commenting on the studies previously mentioned, argue that 
there are clear reasons why the Dutch railways are more efficient than the Austrian railways 
(with a very low efficiency). They claim that this result follows from the high utilisation of the 
infrastructure  in  the  Netherlands  (i.e.,  economies  of  density).  Interestingly,  Gathon  and 
Perelman (1992) find diseconomies of density in the use of trains.  
 
A  paper  by  Cantos,  Pastor  and  Serrano  (1999)  investigates  the  importance  of  output 
specification. Their results show that alternative output specifications lead to different results. 
Nonetheless, these differences can be brought substantially closer when output variables are 
corrected to account for the impact of the load factor.  
 
Cantos and Maudos (2001) estimate both cost and revenue frontier functions. In so doing, the 
authors are able to calculate the losses associated with both cost and revenue inefficiencies. 
Their empirical analysis shows the existence of significant potential losses of revenue. They 
argue that it is time for a re-orientation from cost efficiency and productivity towards a policy 
focus on revenue. Policies such as concessions/franchises are regarded as positive, since they 
are compatible with the recommendations above. 
 
1 Following Nash and Rivera-Trujillo (2004), a word of caution is in order. It could be that the direction of causality is the 
other way around. That is, inefficient railways require high subsidies to survive, whilst high costs and low productivity might 
be the result of public service obligations to provide services such as peak commuter services which are costly but socially 
desirable.  
2 As most European railways are not free to operate on purely commercial terms, the output measure should therefore not 
only reflect the physical nature of output, but also the public service obligations and the product they are actually selling 
(e.g., quality of service).   13 
A recent study by Lan and Lin (2004) focuses on the non-storable nature of railway services, 
distinguishing  between  technical  efficiency  (a  transform  of  outputs  (seat  kilometres)  from 
inputs) and technical effectiveness (a transform of consumption (passenger kilometres) from 
inputs). Railway services’ productive efficiency can be higher than its effectiveness (in terms of 
sales), because, once produced, outputs cannot be stockpiled for future sales. The authors find 
that the major decline of the rail industry should not be attributed to rail’s poor performance in 
technical efficiency or service effectiveness; rather it is the consequence of higher level-of-
service of other modes. In fact, their results indicate that the rail industry has a positive progress 
in recent years (1995-2001). 
 
Rivera-Trujillo (2004) concentrates on freight transport during the period 1980-1999, which is 
the most important segment in North and South American railways. The countries included in 
the analysis are the United States, Canada, Brazil, Mexico and Chile. The results show that a 
great part of productivity improvement was due to technological change rather than technical 
efficiency change. Rivera-Trujillo notes that further research is needed to the selection and 
specification of the variables in order to obtain internationally agreed performance measures in 
the rail industry, as well as, on the whole period in which the recent rail reforms took place to 
determine their degree of success. 
 
Relatively very few studies extend efficiency analysis to the impact of rail restructuring in the 
1990s. A study by Friebel, et al. (2003) investigates to what extend free entry, independent 
regulation and the separation of infrastructure from operations affects railway performance of 
11  European  countries,  over  the  period  1980-2000.  Using  production  frontier  analysis,  the 
authors find that reforms have efficiency improving effects if implemented sequentially, while 
reforms introduced in a package have neutral effects at best. Moreover, their results show that 
full  separation  is  not  a  necessary  condition  for  increasing  efficiency.  This  result  seems  to 
conflict with the firm belief of many policy-makers. Interestingly, Friebel et al. (2003) find that 
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3  Methodology 
Both parametric and non-parametric approaches to efficiency measurement are frequently used 
for estimating frontier functions.
3 The former are estimated by using econometric (statistical) 
methods, while the latter are assessed by applying mathematical programming.  Essentially, two 
popular methods can be distinguished: stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and data envelopment 
analysis (DEA). A common feature of both approaches is that information is extracted from 
extreme observations from a body of data to determine the best-practise production frontier. In 
contrast to other approaches that evaluate producers relative to an average producer, extreme 
point methods such as SFA and DEA compare each producer with only the ‘best’ producers. 
Although this characteristic lies at the hearth of frontier analysis, it also makes it vulnerable to 
outliers.  An  important  assumption  behind  these  two  methods  is  that  if  a  given  producer  is 
capable of producing Y units of output with X inputs, then other producers should also be able 
to produce the same if they were to operate efficiently. Another property of frontier analysis is 
that it is units invariant. That is, changing the unit of measurement does not affect the value of 
the efficiency measure.  
 
SFA is a parametric method for estimating frontier functions and thereby measuring productive 
efficiency. SFA involves the use of econometric methods to estimate the production frontier, 
and  measures  the  efficiency  of  a  firm  using  the  residuals  from  the  estimated  equation. 
Consequently,  the  approach  requires  the  specification  of  a  particular  functional  form  (e.g., 
Cobb-Douglas or translog) to describe the technology or efficiency frontier. Since deviations 
from the frontier are treated as stochastic rather than deterministic, SFA is less sensitive to 
outliers than deterministic methods. Furthermore, the parametric nature provides researchers 
with  interesting  information,  such  as  cost  or  input  elasticities,  provided  the  functional 
specification is correct. 
 
One of the main drawbacks of SFA is that the approach is only well developed for single-output 
technologies. For multiple-output technologies, researchers have to create a combined variable 
for either inputs or outputs. In the case consistent accounting rules, costs may well serve as a 
combined  indicator  for  inputs,  which  explains  why  many  SFA-applications  are  based  on 
(translog)  cost  functions.  An  alternative  approach  would  be  to  formulate  production  as  a 
weighted sum of passenger and freight  kilometres and estimate the production function for 
different sets of weights. Further research may be aimed at exploring this possibility. 
 
 
3 In his seminal paper, Farrell (1957), drawing upon the work of Debreu (1951) and Koopmans (1951), suggested a measure 
of productive efficiency which reflects the ability of a firm to obtain maximal output from a given set of inputs. The pioneer of 
modern efficiency measurement illustrated his idea in input/input space using an input-reducing focus. Hence the name 
input-orientated efficiency measures.  
   16 
DEA  models  are  non-parametric  and  deterministic.  The  choice  between  input  or  output 
orientation depends on which quantities (inputs or outputs) the firms have most control over. In 
most cases input orientation seems most appropriate (Coelli et al., 1998). DEA models that 
assume constant returns to scale (CRS) are insensitive to the specific orientation. However, 
when DEA analysis is extended to allow for variable returns to scale (VRS), efficiency scores 
can differ between the two orientations.  The CRS assumption is only valid when all firms are 
operating at an optimal scale, defined as the region in which scale economies do not differ 
significantly from zero. In this region firms cannot take advantage of returns to scale by altering 
in size. If this is not the case, VRS are required to correct for scale efficiencies.  
 
Coelli and Perelman (2000) estimate multi-output distance functions using corrected ordinary 
least squares. This approach is advocated because it avoids making unrealistic assumptions of 
firm behaviour, while at the same time it is able to handle the multi-output nature of railways. 
The distance function results are compared with those obtained from single-output production 
functions. They find that the results differ substantially between the two methods. As a result, 
the authors doubt the reliability of the single-output methods.  
 
One of the major strengths of DEA is its ability to handle multiple input and output cases. 
Unlike  parametric  techniques,  DEA  has  no  difficulty  in  accommodating  the  multi-output 
structure of railways that commonly produce both passenger and freight services. It does not 
require the construction of an aggregated index measure of output. Furthermore, DEA does not 
require  the  specification  of  a  particular  functional  form  for  the  production  function  and 
distribution  of  the  data.  Therefore  it  avoids  the  potential  bias  from  selecting  an  incorrect 
functional form, rendering it more flexible than parametric techniques in approximating the true 
production frontier (Oum and Yu, 1994).  
 
A disadvantage of DEA is that it does not take data noise (random shocks and measurement 
error)  into  consideration,  because  it  is  a  deterministic  approach.  As  a  result,  the  efficiency 
estimates  may  be  biased  if  the  production  process  is  largely  characterised  by  stochastic 
elements. For this reason, DEA can be very sensitive to outliers in the data set. Moreover, 
statistical hypothesis tests are not directly possible with this technique. Furthermore, DEA has 
no formal tests to assess the merits of including or excluding variables or the specific DEA 
model choice. Alternatively, one must rely upon the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion 
and  exclusion  of  variables  and  judgement  (McMillan  and  Datta,  1998).  As  a  consequence, 
variable selection is a most critical part of DEA. The same holds for the selection of firms in the 
data set. Firms are expected to be relatively homogenous and employ a common technology to 
convert inputs into outputs.  
   17 
Our analysis uses DEA to establish relative efficiency scores. The prime reason for choosing 
DEA is the fact that railways are a multi-product (i.e. passenger and cargo transport) industry 
and that the lack of consistent accounting data does not enable us to calculate comparable cost 
figures in an international context. Therefore, DEA’s ability of taking into account multiple 
inputs and outputs is the decisive consideration in choosing our methodology. 
 
 
   18   19 
4  Data 
The characteristics of the production process of railways are complex, making measurement of 
the  performance  of  railways  also  complicated.  In  particular,  the  multiplicity  of  inputs  and 
outputs poses some problems. As to output, railways transport both passengers and freight. As a 
result, passenger-kilometres and tonne-kilometres are usually the starting point for measuring 
railway output. Although it would be simple to add these together to form a measure of output 
known as total traffic, this would be inappropriate, because the two outputs require different 
combinations of inputs and have a different unit of measurement (people vs. freight). They tend 
to have inherently different cost structures (Productivity Commission, 1999). Fortunately, DEA 
is able to deal with the multiplicity of inputs and outputs. Concerning inputs, railway companies 
essentially use labour and capital to produce output (Affuso et al., 2002). Capital consists of 
rolling stock, tracks and stations.  
 
As no common accounting practise exists among the different railway systems, comparative 
international efficiency analysis is best based on physical measures rather than value measures 
(Cowie and Riddington, 1996). Therefore, we use physical measures such as the amount of 
kilometres and employees instead of monetary measures like revenues and costs.  
 
Ultimately, the choice of variables is constrained by the availability of data. This study uses two 
outputs  (passenger-kilometres  and  tonne-kilometres)  and  three  inputs  (staff,  track,  and  total 
rolling stock). Several previous studies have used the same measures of output and input. Thus 
use of rolling stock as a measure for input may be troublesome, as the rail fleet mix is probably 
not  homogenous  over  countries.  Any  alternative  measure  suffers  from  the  same  problem 
however. The most obvious alternative, number of locomotives, is even less comparable over 
the sample, because of the use of mixed cars in some, but not all, countries. 
 
When  studying  transportation  productivity,  one  can  distinguish  between  the  productivity  of 
offering transport capacity (e.g seat kilometres) versus the productivity of actually transporting 
(e.g passenger kilometres). The first provides a technical interpretation of transport, whereas the 
second measure also takes allocation into account. As an extreme example, one might think of a 
rail company being very efficient in running empty trains on a track. Technically, this is very 
efficient, but from the viewpoint of allocation it is useless. There may be good reasons to look 
at the technical interpretation, as the allocation decisions may not all be in the hands of the rail 
company,  for  instance  because  of  government  obligations  to  serve  very  thin  routes. 
Nevertheless, we decided to look at efficiency with allocation in mind, since we are mainly 
interested in the effect of competition design on welfare. 
   20 
The primary data source of this study is International Union of Railways (2003). The data from 
this source covers the period 1990-2001 for the railway systems of 52 countries from over the 
world. At present, it is the key source of information from which most industry analysts and 
academics obtain their information on railways. It is especially made to ensure comparability 
and consistency through the use of common definitions. However, in the end it is dependent on 
the quality of data provided by the individual railways. Supplemental data is received from the 
Norwegian Office of Statistics and a railway magazine from the Netherlands.  
 
Each railway system is represented by the main railway organisation in the specific country. 
When a railway system is made up of more than one organisation, we combine the operations to 
a single organisation.
4 Despite the extensiveness of the data set, considerable data gaps and 
inconsistencies exist, severely limiting the number of railway systems available for assessment. 
In particular, the railway systems of the United Kingdom and Ireland could not be included due 
to poor data. Nash and Shires (1999) find this issue a major source of concern. They argue that, 
due to institutional changes,  railway operators are often reluctant to release details of their 
operations. This makes data collection difficult and reduces the scope for future research. 
 
Given the focus of this study, namely the analysis of the effect of the design of competition on 
productive  efficiency,  and  the  fact  that  we  use  DEA,  we  need  to  ensure  that  the  group  of 
countries is rather homogenous. That is, the railways systems have to be comparable in their 
production characteristics. From the initial set of countries, sixteen countries are available that 
have enough observations; that is, at most two observations are missing. Within this group, 
Japan, the United States and Luxembourg exhibit characteristics that  make them somewhat 
different from the others.  
 
Luxembourg is the smallest country in the data set, with a network size of about one tenth of 
that of Denmark, the second smallest country. As a consequence, Luxembourg has a unique 
scale that will always make it a fully efficient country. Even applying VRS DEA does not solve 
this problem, because Luxembourg has no countries, or in DEA terms peers, to be compared 
with.  Including  Luxembourg  would  not  only  limit  the  discriminatory  power  of  the  DEA 
analysis, it would also distort the analysis of the variation in efficiency scores in the subsequent 
regression  analysis.  Similarly,  including  the  United  States  would  be  detrimental  to  the 
discriminatory power of the empirical analysis. Compared to the second largest country in the 
data set (Germany), United States have a network that is approximately six times as long as 
Germany’s. So, both Luxembourg and the United States are left out of the data set in order to 
create a set of countries that are comparable. 
 
 
4 Note that this influences our conclusions on scale and density. These conclusions are to be interpreted at the (national) 
system level rather than at the firm level.    21 
Japan  differs  from  the  other  countries  because  of  the  large  output  in  terms  of  passenger 
kilometres,  exceeding  the  largest  European  country  by  almost  150  percent.  Furthermore, 
Japan’s railway system is well known for its formidable efficiency. This may partly be related 
to market and system design, partly to cultural factors and partly by the socio-geographical 
outlay of the country. Japan’s very densely populated urban areas are separated by distances  
ranging from 100 to 500 km, which is an ideal spatial environment for rail operations. The 
differences between Japan and the other countries in the sample are not as large as in the case of 
Luxembourg and the United States, so we see no reason to exclude Japan from our analysis. On 
the  other  hand,  as  we  will  see  later  on,  Japan’s  special  position  influences  our  results 
considerably, urging us to treat Japan separately in our analysis. 
Table 4.1  Descriptive statistics of the data 
           Europe    Japan   
                   
Variable  Symbol  Unit of measurement  Mean  Min  Max  Standard 
deviation 
  Mean   
                    Outputs                   
Passengers 
kilometres 
Pkm  Billions of passenger 
kilometres 
19.5  2.1  74.0  21.6    182.5   
Freight 
kilometres 
Fkm  Billions of gross-hauled 
tonne-kilometres  
13.6  1.4  100.0  18.8    24.3   
                   
Inputs                   
Input of labour  L  Annual average number 
of staff (x1000)  
70.4  6.6  482.3  87.8    182.5   
Tracks  T  Track length at the end of 
the year (km x 1000) 
11.2  2.0  41.7  11.4    20.2   
Input of 
capital 
C  Annual average number 
of rolling stock (x 1000) 
55.1  3.0  43.8  81.1    48.9   
                 
Control variables                 
Total area  AREA  1000 Square miles     89.7  11.7  210.7  70.1    152.4   
GDP per 
capita 
GDP  In constant prices (2000) 
1000 US dollars PPPs    
23.3  6.8  37.1  5.6    24.9   
Population 
density 
POPDEN  Population per square 
mile 
396  36  1224  325    824   
Traffic 
structure 
TSTRUC  Passenger kilometres / 
total traffic in kilometres  
0.58  0.23  0.90  0.20    0.91   
Traffic density  TDEN  Total traffic in kilometres 
(in millions) / total length 
of lines in kilometres  
3.0  1.2  7.1  1.4    13.3   
 
Countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,  Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 
Period: 1990 - 2001 (Denmark until 2000, Sweden until 1999) 
Sources: UIC (2003), Alexandersson and Hultén (2005); Berne and Pogorel (2003); Farsi et al. (2005); IBM (2004); Mizutani and Nakamura 
(2004); Nilson (2002); OECD (1998) OECD (2005); Nash and Rivera-Trujillo (2004); Thompson (2003); United Nations (2003); Van de Velde 
(1999); various websites of rail companies and DG Transport of European Union.   22 
Descriptive statistics of the input and output variables are presented in the table below. Because 
of the special position of Japan discussed earlier, we present Japanese figures separately, giving 
only the mean over time, as the standard deviation over time is of less interest to our analysis. 
 
In the second stage of our analysis, we will use several variables reflecting the institutional 
design  of  competition.  The  data  for  the  these  variables  are  constructed  using  a  variety  of 
sources. For the exact list of materials used to construct this set, the reader is referred to the 
bottom of Table 4.2. This table also provides an overview of changes in competition design in 
the various countries, including aspects of structural design that we do not assess empirically 
due to lack of variation in the data. The quality of these data is verified through a survey 
submitted to a number of experts of the different national railway systems considered in this 
study. Once more, note that there are certain limits concerning the extent to which one can 
interpret the results, because there are many reform specificities across countries that cannot be 
perfectly captured in an empirical analysis (see Friebel et al., 2003).    23 
Table 4.2         Structural design of the railway industry in European countries and Japan, 1990 - 2001 
Country  Characteristic in 1990  Changes during 1990 - 2001 
     
Austria  vertically and horizontally integrated,  
no competition, state-owned, public agency 
- accounting separation in 1992 
- independent management in 1992 
     
Belgium  vertically and horizontally integrated, no competition, state-
owned, public agency 
- accounting separation in 1993 
- independent management in 1991 
     
Denmark  vertically and horizontally integrated, no competition, state-
owned, public agency 
- institutional separation in 1997 
- independent management in 1999 
     
Finland  vertically and horizontally integrated, no competition, state-
owned, public agency 
- institutional separation in 1995 
France  vertically and horizontally integrated, no competition, state-
owned, public agency 
- accounting separation in 1995 
- institutional separation in 1997 
- independent management in 1997 
     
Germany  vertically and horizontally integrated, no competition, state-
owned, public agency 
- accounting separation in 1994 
- free entry (freight) in 1994 
- regional tendering in 1996 
- independent management in 1993 
     
Italy  vertically and horizontally integrated, no competition, state-
owned, public agency 
- accounting separation in 1998 
- independent management in 1992 
Japan  vertically integrated, horizontally separated, infrastructure 
competition, public agency 
- yardstick competition in 1997 
     
Netherlands  vertically and horizontally integrated, no competition, state-
owned, public agency 
- accounting separation in 1995 
- horizontal separation in 2000 
- free entry (freight) in 1998 
- regional tendering in 1999 
- independent management in 1995 
     
Norway  vertically legally separated, horizontally integrated, no 
competition, state-owned, public agency 
- independent management in 1997 
     
Portugal  vertically and horizontally integrated, no competition, state-
owned, public agency 
- institutional separation in 1997 
- independent management in 1997 
     
Spain  vertically and horizontally integrated, no competition, state-
owned, public agency 
- accounting separation in 1997 
- independent management in 1994 
     
Sweden  vertically institutionally separated, horizontally integrated, 
regional tendering, state-owned, independent management 
- free entry (freight) in 1996 
     
Switzerland  vertically and horizontally integrated, no competition, state-
owned, independent management 
- accounting separation in 1999 
- free entry (freight) in 1999 
 
Sources: Alexandersson and Hultén (2005); Berne and Pogorel (2003); Farsi et al. (2005); IBM (2004); Mizutani and Nakamura (2004); 
Nilson (2002); OECD (1998) OECD (2005); Nash and Rivera-Trujillo (2004); Thompson (2003); UIC (2003); United Nations (2003); Van 
de Velde (1999); various websites of rail companies and DG Transport of European Union. 
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5  Efficiency analysis results 
This section presents estimates of relative productive efficiency for the 14 countries in our data 
set.  The  productive  efficiency  indices  are  estimated  by  using  the  Efficiency  Measurement 
System  (EMS)  program  by  Holger  Steel.
5  As  we  stated  earlier,  we  show  the  DEA  results 
including and excluding Japan. We use variable returns to scale DEA as most of the railway 
systems in our analysis are not operating at the optimal scale (see Preston, 1994). The DEA-
results are based the inputs (labour, track and capital) and outputs (passenger kilometres and 
freight kilometres) mentioned in table 4.1. All other variables are used in the second stage of 
our analysis. 
 




1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001   
                           
Austria  0.80  0.80  0.77  0.76  0.80  0.83  0.83  0.87  0.90  0.91  1.00  1.00   
Belgium  1.00  1.00  0.99  0.96  1.00  0.96  0.95  0.96  0.96  0.95  0.97  0.94   
Denmark  0.87  0.87  0.89  0.89  0.87  0.87  0.87  0.92  0.91  1.00  1.00  .   
Finland  0.77  0.74  0.76  0.84  0.90  0.91  0.89  0.96  0.97  0.97  1.00  1.00   
France  0.77  0.74  0.70  0.72  0.75  0.72  0.80  0.84  0.89  0.93  0.98  1.00   
Germany  0.80  0.82  0.75  0.72  0.77  0.76  0.76  0.88  0.92  0.93  1.00  1.00   
Italy  0.93  0.94  0.93  0.89  0.93  0.97  0.97  0.97  0.93  0.94  1.00  1.00   
Netherlands  0.89  0.96  0.97  0.97  0.95  1.00  0.97  0.96  0.99  0.98  1.00  1.00   
Norway  0.76  0.81  0.80  0.81  0.81  0.83  0.89  0.87  0.94  1.00  0.95  1.00   
Portugal  0.67  0.68  0.68  0.84  0.88  0.90  0.89  0.89  0.88  0.74  0.91  0.95   
Spain  0.51  0.50  0.52  0.59  0.59  0.64  0.68  0.75  0.82  0.88  0.93  1.00   
Sweden  0.86  0.85  0.96  0.96  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.92  0.98  1.00  .  .   
Switzerland  0.59  0.61  0.58  0.58  0.63  0.65  0.64  0.71  0.74  0.81  0.87  0.93   
 
. = data not available 




5 See EMS: Efficiency Measurement System User’s Manual, available at www.wiso.uni-dortmund.de/lsfg/or/scheel/ems.   26 




1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001   
                           
Austria  0.80  0.80  0.77  0.76  0.80  0.83  0.83  0.87  0.90  0.91  1.00  1.00   
Belgium  1.00  0.99  0.99  0.96  1.00  0.96  0.95  0.96  0.96  0.95  0.97  0.94   
Denmark  0.87  0.87  0.89  0.89  0.87  0.87  0.87  0.92  0.91  1.00  1.00  .   
Finland  0.77  0.74  0.76  0.84  0.90  0.91  0.89  0.96  0.97  0.97  1.00  1.00   
France  0.23  0.22  0.22  0.23  0.24  0.25  0.27  0.29  0.30  0.31  0.32  0.31   
Germany   0.80   0.81  0.72  0.68  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.88  0.92  0.91  1.00  1.00   
Italy  0,52  0.58  0.57  0.54  0.61  0.67  0.64  0.69  0.67  0.66  0.66  0.64   
Japan  1,00  1.00  1.00  0.99  0.97  0.99  1.00  1.00  0.98  0.99  0.99  1.00   
Netherlands  0,89  0.96  0.97  0.97  0.95  1.00  0.97  0.96  0.99  0.98  1.00  1.00   
Norway  0,76  0.81  0.80  0.81  0.81  0.83  0.89  0.87  0.94  1.00  0.95  1.00   
Portugal  0,67  0.68  0.68  0.82  0.88  0.89  0.89  0.89  0.88  0.74  0.91  0.94   
Spain  0,33  0.33  0.33  0.36  0.36  0.39  0.40  0.42  0.45  0.47  0.49  0.51   
Sweden  0,86  0.85  0.96  0.96  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.90  0.97  1.00  .  .   
Switzerland  0,57  0.58  0.55  0.54  0.58  0.59  0.57  0.61  0.64  0.69  0.74  0.76   
 
. = data not available 
Source: CPB estimates 
 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 present the results. Several noteworthy aspects emerge from these results. 
First of all, most countries evolve over time towards a DEA index of 100%. This suggests that, 
in final years of the data set, the countries form a relatively homogenous group as their relative 
efficiency scores are identical. However, in the beginning of the nineties, significant differences 
were present between the countries.  
 
It seems likely that the railway systems have grown towards each other in terms of relative 
productive  efficiency.  Second,  some  countries,  notably,  Belgium,  Netherlands,  Japan,  and 
Sweden, have the most efficient railway systems over the whole period.  
 
Third, several countries experience a big drop in their relative efficiency levels when Japan is 
added to the analysis. Looking at the two tables, it seems that especially countries such as 
France, Spain and Italy are affected by including Japan to the data set. Switzerland’s results are 
also influenced to some extent. Japan is the efficient peer for these countries, meaning that 
Japan’s  input-output  mix  is  comparable  to  these  countries.  Including  Japan’s  very  efficient 
railway system in the analysis implies that all countries that are compared to Japan have lower 
efficiency scores. 
 
We have plotted the DEA results of both tables against each other in Figure 5.1.  Every country-
year combination is represented by a point. From this figure, it appears that most countries have 
(nearly) equal efficiency levels in two models as most dots are on the 45 degree line. However,   27 
the countries mentioned above have very different efficiency levels between the two models. 
These countries are represented by the points below the 45 degree line.  .  







0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%  
It is clear from the figure that the inclusion or inclusion of Japan makes quite a difference to the 
DEA results. A drawback of the use of a non-parametric method like DEA is that we can use 
neither parameters nor test statistics to assess the reason behind the high efficiency score. As 
there  is  no  clear  theoretical  argument  to  either  include  or  exclude  Japan,  we  will  further 
investigate the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of Japan in the following chapter.   
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6  Relationship between competition design and relative 
productive efficiency 
We use a limited dependent variable model to estimate the effects of the design of competition 
on productive efficiency. Applying the usual least-squares estimator in this case would result in 
biased results, since it fails in treating censored observations properly (Hill et al., 2001).  The 
regression function to be estimated is expressed as follows: 
it i
it it it it it t
it it it it it it
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where DEA is the dependent variable derived from the efficiency analysis and ε is a random 
term, which is assumed to be symmetrically distributed with zero mean and constant variance. 
All other variables are introduced below. Most terms differ across countries and time and are 
thus indexed by it. We include a time trend, TIMEt, to represent technological progress.  
 
Aside from their signs, the coefficients of Tobit models are not easy to interpret directly. One 
way to interpret the parameters is to consider the marginal effect of a change in xik upon the 
expected DEA outcome. According to Verbeek (2004), this is simply given by the model’s 
coefficient multiplied by the probability of having a non-censored outcome. The latter is equal 
to the standard normal density function. Formally, this can be written as: 
 










Table 6.1 provides an overview of the dummy variables we use. Two dummy variables are 
designed to reflect the vertical structure of the railway system in a country. We distinguish 
between institutional (full), VERT1, and accounting (partial) separation, VERT2, to investigate 
whether there is a difference between the two options.  
 
Competition ‘in’ and ‘for’ the market are represented by free entry, ENTRY, and competitive 
tendering, TEND, respectively. Further, managerial independence from the government of the 
railway  company  is  captured  by  a  specific  dummy  variable,  INDP.  Finally,  to  identify  the 
unique characteristics of the Japanese railway system, we use a special dummy variable for this 
country, DUMJAP. Note however that this dummy does not affect countries that are in Japan’s 
peer group. 
 
Unfortunately, features such as horizontal structure (freight and passenger integrated/separated), 
ownership (private or public), infrastructure competition and yardstick competition, could not   30 
be included as a dummy variable, because of too little variance in these features in our data set.
6 
As a consequence, it is not (yet) possible to investigate the influence of these variables on 
productive efficiency in this research. With the help of better data sets, which encompass a 
larger set of countries and more recent data, further research should be aimed at investigating 
these aspects empirically.  
Table 6.1  Description of regression variables 
Variable  Symbol  Description 
     
Dummy variables     
Institutional (or full) separation  VERT1  If variable is 1, then infrastructure and services are institutionally 
separated; 0 if this is not the case. 
Accounting (or partial) separation  VERT2  If variable is 1, then infrastructure and services are separated on 
an accounting basis; 0 if this is not the case  
Free entry  ENTRY  If variable is 1, then legislation is transposed that allows free 
entry to competitors (either freight or passenger) and competition 
has evolved to a significant extent; 0 if this is not the case.
a 
Competitive tendering  TEND  If variable is 1, then competitive tendering is used to procure 
regional railway franchises; 0 if this is not the case. 
Managerial independence from 
the government 
INDP  If variable is 1, then legislation is transposed that assures 
independent management from the government of railway 
companies; 0, if this is not the case.
b 
Japan dummy  DUMJAP  If variable is 1, then country is Japan; 0, if this is not the case 
     
Control variables     
Total area  AREA  Measured in 1000 square miles 
Gross Domestic Product per 
capita 
GDP  Measured in constant prices (2000) 1000 US dollars PPPs 
Population density  POPDEN  Measured in population per square mile 
Traffic structure  TSTRUC  measured by passenger kilometres / total traffic in kilometres 
Traffic density  TDEN  Total traffic in kilometres (in millions) / total length of lines in 
kilometres 
a Significant evolution of competition implies that competitors of the incumbent obtain sufficient and nontrivial 
large market shares. We use a threshold value of 1%. Admittedly, this value is rather arbitrary, but required 
for this analysis.  
b Managerial independence as it is prescribed by the European Union by directive 91/440/EEC. 
 
In order to arrive at accurate results of the effects of the designs of competition, we need to 
correct for particular environmental variables outside the control of the management of the 
railway firm. The control variables included in this analysis and their definitions are also listed 
in table 6.1. The first factor we control for is the influence of population density, POPDEN. 
High population density might facilitate (in terms of efficiency) a more intense use of inputs 
than would otherwise be the case. The second control variable is GDP per capita, GDP. Higher 
 
6 Estimations including these variables did not deliver any meaningful results and are therefore not published in this study.   31 
purchasing  power,  through  income  effects,  could  result  in  a  higher  mobility  level  of  the 
customers of a railway system.  
 
Besides these two factors, we also control for the effects of country size, AREA (facilitates 
economies  of  size),  traffic  structure,  TSTRUC  (to  correct  for  the  cost  difference  between 
producing freight and passenger services), and traffic density, TDEN (facilitates economies of 
density, in so far this is not captured by population density and income per capita). Note that 
traffic density is not fully beyond the control of management, since firms can influence the 
density  of  traffic  by  changing  their  prices  or  supply  of  services.  Nevertheless,  social  and 
regulatory objectives affect to a large extent whether and how often certain lines are to be 
operated, thereby influencing traffic density. 
Table 6.2            Tobit regression results   
                   
Model  (1) Europe             (2) Europe + Japan       
                   
Dependent variable                   
                   
DEA efficiency indices                   
                   





  Marginal 
effect 




  Marginal 
effect 
 
                     
CONSTANT  0.5827
 
(0.0493)  ***  0.4643    1.0987
 
(0.0651)  ***  0.8746   
VERT1  0.0447  (0.0231)  *  0.0356    − 0.0005  (0.0301)    − 0.0004   
VERT2  0.0225  (0.0213)    0.0179    0.0854  (0.0282)  ***  0.0680   
ENTRY  − 0.0812  (0.0311)  ***  − 0.0647    − 0.0773  (0.0417)  *  − 0.0615   
TEND  0.0826  (0.0346)  **  0.0658    0.2641  (0.0461)  ***  0.2102   
INDP  − 0.0691  (0.0181)  ***  − 0.0551    − 0.1495  (0.0239)  ***  − 0.1190   
TIME  0.0211  (0.0033)  ***  0.0168    0.0162  (0.0040)  ***  0.01290   
AREA  0.0002  (0.0001)    0.0002    − 0.0018  (0.0002)  ***  − 0.0014   
POPDEN  −7.75´10
-5  (5.45´10
-5)    −6.18´10
-5    5.39´10
-5  (7.22´10
-5)    4.30´10
-5   
GDP
  0.0016  (0.0014)    0.0013    − 0.0012  (0.0018)    − 0.0010   
TDEN  0.0776  (0.0118)  ***  0.0618    0.0261  (0.0154)  *  0.0208   
TSTRUC  − 0.1331  (0.0481)  ***  − 0.1061    − 0.5422  (0.0636)  ***  − 0.4316   
DUMJAP            0.3929
 
(0.1477)  ***  0.3131   
                     
Log likelihood  127.13    93.1 
Adjusted R-squared  0.67    0.82 
 
Number of observations  153    165   
Note: Asterisks (*), (**), (***) represents statistical significance from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.   32 
Table 6.2 presents the regression results of two Tobit models. The difference between the first 
and  the  second  model  is  the  inclusion  of  Japan.  In  order  to  account  for  the  possible 
particularities of this country a dummy variable is included in the second regression. Note, 
however, that even with a dummy variable, differences can be substantial between the results of 
the two models, because the inclusion of Japan also affects the efficiency scores of some other 
countries  as  we  have  seen  in  the  previous  section.  Both  the  regression  coefficient  and  the 
marginal effect of each variable are reported in the table.  
 
The  adjusted  R-squared  statistics  indicate  that  both  models  perform  well  in  explaining  the 
variation of efficiency scores. The majority of coefficients are statistically different from zero at 
the 5% level of significance. In addition, multi-collinearity does not pose a problem, because 
the correlation among the explanatory variables is reasonably low. As we use a censored limited 
dependent variable, heteroskedasticity cannot be a problem. That is, the size of the variation in 
the residuals of the DEA indices is on average the same across countries.   
 
Looking at the control variables, we find that the effect of both population density and income 
per capita are insignificantly different from zero. Furthermore, our results suggest that traffic 
density is important for productive efficiency. This is in line with the results found by Cowie 
and  Riddington  (1996).  High  utilisation  of  the  track  network  is  important  for  productive 
efficiency,  due  to  economies  of  density.  We  also  establish  that  railways  systems  that 
concentrate  on  passenger  transport  have  lower  levels  of  productive  efficiency  than  freight 
oriented systems. This is also consistent with the literature. As aforementioned, one passenger-
kilometre of output costs much more than one tonne-kilometre of output. Even though DEA 
corrects this somewhat, our results suggest that a control variable is necessary to correct for 
differences within peer groups. Further, when economies of density are accounted for by a 
traffic density variable, both population density and income effects do not matter for productive 
efficiency.  
 
The main results of our analysis are those regarding the design of competition. First of all, we 
find that competitive tendering improves productive efficiency, which is in line with economic 
intuition as well as with expectations on the design of competition. Our second finding -free 
entry lowers productive efficiency- is much less in line with intuition. The effect of free entry is 
to lower productive efficiency of the incumbent railway company. A possible explanation for 
this result could be that free entry may disable firms to reap economies of density. For instance, 
sharing terminal space and traffic may reduce the efficiency of railway operations. In addition, 
train scheduling can become less flexible due to competition on the tracks (BRTE, 2003). These 
problems may be overcome by efficient coordination, but it should be noted that coordination 
comes at a cost. 
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Perhaps even more surprising is the third finding that more autonomy of management lowers 
productive efficiency.
7 However, if one looks at the national railway markets in Europe this 
effect might not come as a bolt from the blue. Most of the incumbent railway companies are 
state owned and do not face any competitive pressure. Increased independence may give rise to 
principal-agent  problems,  as  more  autonomy  increases  the  information  asymmetry  between 
government and management. Without sufficient competition or adequate regulation, this may 
deteriorate incentives for productive efficiency. This is point is also proposed by Vickers and 
Yarrow (1991), De Fraja (1991), and Caves and Christensen (1980).  
 
The second and third result are in conflict with previous studies. Others found that free entry 
(Friebel et al., 2003) and more independence (e.g., Gathon and Pestieau, 1995) are efficiency 
improving. The different definitions of free entry and managerial independence between those 
studies and the present study could possibly explain the divergence in the results. For instance, 
Gathon and Pestieau use an autonomy index based on a questionnaire created in 1990 for their 
managerial independence variable, whereas we use a dummy variable to represent whether a 
country has implemented legislation to create more managerial independence. In contrast to the 
paper by Gathon and Pestieau, our dummy variable is year specific. Moreover, we use different 
data and estimation method to measure productive efficiency. For example, Friebel et al. (2003) 
use SFA, while we use DEA. Lastly, the period under investigation by Gathon and Pestieau 
(1986 to 1988) is different from ours (1990 to 2001).  
 
The results regarding vertical separation are not consistent between the two models. Whereas in 
the  first  model  institutional  separation  is  needed  to  get  a  positive  effect  on  productive 
efficiency, the second model tells that accounting separation is sufficient. So, while the results 
suggest that separation could be beneficial for productive efficiency, the results disagree on 
which form of separation is preferred from a productive efficiency point of view. An alternative 
explanation  would be that the positive effects of  more transparency are offset by losses in 
economies of scope or by duplicating facilities in the case of full separation. 
 
Although the signs of the coefficients are mostly robust across the two models, the order of 
magnitude of the coefficients alters considerably when Japan is included. This effect is caused 
by the drop in the DEA scores of some European countries explained in the previous section. 
For this reason, the results regarding the order of magnitude of the coefficients in the second 




7 Note that our definition of autonomy does not rule out that governments set equity-related goals for rail companies.   34   35 
7  Conclusion 
We used a two stage approach to identify the effects of different designs of competition on 
relative  productive  efficiency  of  railways.  The  first  stage,  using  DEA,  measures  relative 
productive efficiency of the railways of a number of European countries and Japan. The results 
show a large variation in the efficiency scores across countries which is decreasing over time. In 
the second stage of the empirical analysis, we applied Tobit regression to investigate the effects 
of various designs of competition on the efficiency results derived in the first stage. We find no 
unambiguous results for the effect of vertical separation on productive efficiency. The main 
results are that competitive tendering encourages productive efficiency, whereas free entry and 
increased managerial independence may deliver the opposite. Noticeably, both latter results are 
in contradiction with economic intuition, as well as with earlier results, as found by Friebel et 
al. (2003) and Gathon and Pestieau (1995) . 
 
The  difference  between  our  results  and  those  found  by  others  may  either  be  caused  by 
differences  in  the  actual  situation  reflected  by  the  data,  by  differences  in  the  definition  of 
variables,  or  by  differences  in  estimation  methods  used.  Further  research  may  be  aimed  at 
taking  a  closer  look  at  these  effects,  especially  as  -over  time-  more  data  on  reformed  rail 
systems will become available. 
 
We also find that both economies of density and the composition of output are important in 
explaining variation in productive efficiency. On the contrary, the impact of population density 
and income per capita is insignificantly different from zero.  
 
What can be deduced from these results for policy purposes? First of all, the results indicate that 
competitive tendering seems to improve productive efficiency. In addition, the results suggest 
that introduction of competition on the tracks may not under all conditions improve productive 
efficiency. Further research may shed light on the background of this finding. Our analysis also 
suggests that providing the management of an incumbent railway company more autonomy 
should  be  done  with  care.  One  should  keep  in  mind  that  greater  autonomy  without  either 
competitive or regulatory pressure is at least vulnerable to inverted incentives for productive 
efficiency. 
 
Due to limitations to the data, we were not able to include an interesting country such as the 
United  Kingdom.  Furthermore,  our  analysis  is  constrained  to  the  period  1990-2001. 
Consequently,  the  effects  of  recent  structural  measures  may  not  be  fully  materialised.  For 
instance, full separation of infrastructure and train services in the Netherlands did not occur 
until 2002. Another important issue is that we only investigate performance in terms of input   36 
and output quantities and therefore disregard important facets such as the quality of service and 
financial affairs. These are recommended avenues for future research. 
 
Apart from using better and more recent data, further research may also be aimed at looking 
more  in  detail  to  the  design  of  competitive  mechanisms.  We  mentioned  the  issue  of 
coordination between operators in markets with free entry. The use of a more precise definition 
of  which  activities  are  to  be  tendered,  would  also  yield  interesting  information.  Similarly, 
further research into the question under which conditions management autonomy will lead to 
higher or lower productive efficiency would be fruitful. On the technical side, further research 
may be aimed at finding a specification that allows us to estimate a stochastic frontier on the 
same data, or to apply the technique of canonical correlations (Bowden and Turkington, 1984) 
with  the  DEA  methodology..  Finally,  diving  deeper  into  the  reasons  behind  Japan’s  high 
efficiency scores may yield interesting results. Multidisciplinary research seems to be in place 
here, as these reasons might be partly cultural and geographical. 
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